内容发布更新时间 : 2024/6/16 7:22:01星期一 下面是文章的全部内容请认真阅读。

2016年上海外国语大学专业学位英语口译/笔译初试

英语翻译基础（100分）

12月26日14:00—17:00

I. Cloze. (共15个空，一空两分，共30分)

卷子上的标题是Here’s why the “American century” will survive rise of China

The American century will survive the rise of China

Joseph Nye March 25, 2015

Entropy is a greater challenge than Chinese growth, writes Joseph Nye

In 1941 Time editor Henry Luce proclaimed “the American century”. Some now see this coming to an end as 1. a result of the nation’s economic and political decline. Many point to the example of US failure to convince its allies to stay out of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, Beijing’s rival to the World Bank; but this was 2.more an example of a faulty decision than evidence of decline, which raises the question of what is the natural life cycle of a nation.

A century is generally the limit for a human organism but countries are social constructs. Rome did not collapse until more than three centuries after it reached its apogee of power in 117AD. After American independence in 1776 Horace Walpole, the British politician, lamented that his nation had been reduced to the level of Sardinia, just as Britain was about to enter the industrial revolution that 3. powered its second century as a global power.

Any effort at assessing American power in the coming decades should 4. take into account how many earlier efforts have been wide of the mark. It is chastening to remember how wildly 5. exaggerated US estimates of Soviet power in the 1970s and of Japanese power in the 1980s were. Today some see the Chinese as 10ft tall and proclaim this “the Chinese century”.

China’s size and relatively rapid economic growth will bring it closer to the US in terms of its power resources in the next few decades. But this does not necessarily mean it will surpass the US in military, economic and soft power.

6. Even if China suffers no big domestic political setback, many projections are simple linear extrapolations of growth rates that are likely to slow in the future.

7.Moreover, economic projections are one dimensional. They ignore US military and soft power advantages, such as the desire of students around the world to attend US universities. They also overlook China’s geopolitical 8. dis-advantages in the Asian balance of power, compared with America’s relations with Europe, Japan and India, which are likely to remain more favourable.

It is not impossible that a challenger such as China, Europe, Russia, India or Brazil will surpass the US in the first half of this century but it is but not likely.

On the question of absolute rather than 9. relative American decline, the US faces serious problems in areas such as debt, secondary education, income in?equality and political gridlock but these are only part of the picture. On the positive side of the ledger are favourable trends in demography, technology and energy as well as abiding factors such as geography and entrepreneurial culture.

The scenarios that could 10. precipitate decline include ones in which the US overreacts to terrorist attacks by turning inwards and thus cuts itself off from the strength it obtains from openness. Alternatively it could react by overcommitting itself, and wasting blood and treasure as it did in Vietnam and Iraq.

As an overall assessment, describing the 21st century as one of American decline is inaccurate and misleading. Though the US has problems it is not in absolute decline, unlike ancient Rome, and it is likely to remain more powerful than any single state in coming decades.

The real problem is not that it will be overtaken by China or another contender but rather that it faces a rise in the power resources of many others—both states and non-state actors such as transnational corporations, terrorist groups and cyber criminals. And it will face an increasing number of global problems that will 11. call on our ability to organise alliances and networks.

12. Contrary to the views of those who proclaim this the Chinese century, we have not entered a post-American world. But the American century of the future will not look the same as in previous decades. The US 13. share of the world economy will be smaller than it was in the middle of the past century.

Furthermore, the complexity created by the rise of other countries, as well as the increased role of non-state actors, will make it harder for even America, the biggest power, to 14. wield influence and organise action. Entropy is a greater challenge than China.

At the same time, even when the US had its greatest preponderance of power resources, it often failed to secure what it wanted. Those who argue that the disorder of today’s world is much worse than in the past should remember a year such as 1956,

when the US was unable to prevent Soviet 15. repression of a revolt in Hungary; or the Suez invasion by our allies Britain, France and Israel.

We must not view the past through rose-tinted glasses. Now, with slightly less preponderance and a much more complex world, the American century will continue for at least a few decades, but it will look very different from when Luce first articulated it.

中国崛起能终结美国世纪吗？

美国哈佛大学教授约瑟夫-奈为英国《金融时报》撰稿

1941年，《时代》杂志(Time)主编亨利-卢斯(Henry Luce)宣称，“美国世纪”已经来临。现在有些人认为，随着美国在经济和政治上走向衰落，美国世纪正趋于结束。许多人援引美国未能阻止盟友加入亚洲基础设施投资银行（AIIB，简称：亚投行）作为一个例子——亚投行是中国政府提议创立、与世界银行(World Bank)争风头的一个机构。但这只能表明一个错误的决定，而不能表明美国已经衰落。这引出一个问题：一个国家正常的生命周期有多长？

一个世纪通常是人类机体生存的极限，但国家是社会结构。古罗马在公元117年达到实力的巅峰，但它随后又延续了300多年才解体。1776年美国独立后，英国政界人士霍勒斯-沃波尔(Horace Walpole)哀叹道，他的国家已沦为撒丁岛（Sardinia，位于意大利半岛的西南方，是地中海的第二大岛——译者注）的水平，可随后英国开启工业革命，在接下来的一个世纪里仍然是全球强国。 要评估美国在今后几十年的实力，就得考虑早先有多少评估不靠谱。别忘了，美国对上世纪70年代的苏联和上世纪80年代的日本都曾做出过离谱的高估，这足以令人引以为戒。如今，一些人认为中国人有10英尺高，并宣称现在是“中国世纪”。

就实力资源而言，庞大的规模和相对快速的经济增长将让中国在今后几十年逼近美国。但这未必意味着中国将在军事、经济和软实力方面超越美国。 即便中国国内没有发生重大的政治挫折，许多预测也只是对经济增长率作简单的线性外推，而未来经济增长是可能放缓的。此外，经济预测只是一个方面。他们忽视了美国在军事和软实力方面的优势，比如世界各地的学生都想到美国上大学。他们也忽视了，相对于美国与欧洲、日本和印度的关系（这些关系很可能保持在比较有利的状况），中国在亚洲实力平衡方面的地缘政治劣势。

中国、欧洲、俄罗斯、印度或巴西等挑战者在本世纪上半叶超越美国不是没有可能，但可能性不大。

在美国绝对（而非相对）衰落的问题上，美国在债务、中学教育、收入不平等以及政治僵局等领域面临严峻问题，但这些只是整个图景的一部分。有利的一面是，美国在人口结构、技术和能源方面的有利趋势以及地理和创业文化等长期有利因素。

可能触发美国衰落的情形包括，美国对恐怖袭击反应过度，转向闭关自守，切断自己从开放获取的力量。抑或它可能过度投入，浪费美国人的生命和财产，就像在越南和伊拉克那样。

作为一个总体评估，将21世纪称为美国衰落的世纪是不准确和误导的。尽