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从公共预算的视角解读美国杰斐逊县政府破产案

1996: A federal judge orders Jefferson County to repair and rebuild its sewer system, after finding that county sewage has polluted rivers and streams.

1997: The county begins six years of massive borrowing for sewer repairs. It also uses some of that money for new sewers not required under the consent decree.打算用新的系统产生的收入来偿还债务。

2008.杰斐逊县的债务不断累积，到2008年,政府债券的受托人宣布县政府可能无力偿还，债券面临违约风险，杰斐逊县债务危机开始浮现。从2008年，一直在考虑地方政府的破产问题。

2011.9杰斐逊县县政务委员会在债务问题的谈判上陷入僵局。来自杰斐逊县代表团的25位民主党议员拒绝与持有31.4亿美元地方债券的债权人达成协议。

2011.11 2011年11月9日,美国阿拉巴马州杰斐逊县县政府向当地法院申请破产。据报道,该县背负的债务达41亿美元。

腐败的梨子

According to the SEC, in March 2002, Charles LeCroy, then managing director for JP Morgan Securities’ southeast regional office in Orlando, Florida, sent a series of emails to his superiors discussing how one of the firm’s competitors (three guesses who) had successfully scored new municipal underwriting and swap business by enlisting赞助 the paid support of the politically connected principals and employees of local broker-dealers. 经纪自营商 LeCroy’s superiors endorsed this strategy, and he provided them with estimates (in emails, no less) of what the going rate for paying these folks off would be.对交易进行了精心设计，使他们的行贿成本转移到该县的纳税人身上。since the JP Morgan bankers were confident no one would check their swap math, there really was not much of a ceiling on the cost they would pass on to taxpayers.

收税的梨子 1999年，杰斐逊政府通过了新的开业许可税法案，而之前的老的开业许可税仍在征收。1999年11月立法者取消了老的开业许可税，但之后杰斐逊政府又成功驳斥了上述决议并继续征收开业许可税。2010年蒙哥马利巡回法官认定新的开业许可税在立法征收的过程中存在问题，认为该税的征收是无效的。新税种的征收提议也没有通过。

http://www.businessinsider.com/the-incredible-story-of-the-jefferson-county-bankruptcy-one-of-the-greatest-financial-ripoffs-of-all-time-2011-10

https://books.google.co.jp/books?id=SRZuBAAAQBAJ&pg=PT112&lpg=PT112&dq=Alabama+Jefferson+County+bankruptcy+public+budget&source=bl&ots=sAGO0ea3uL&sig=TawlnnxGMYGPXFdt8v0seh-Oe6Y&hl=zh-TW&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwjP9anp8ofRAhVJmJQKHbmACGUQ6AEIKTAC#v=onepage&q&f=false

1.破产之后,政府没有多少选择。上级政府是不会替他们分忧解难的。这是因为美国的各级政府预算独立,联邦、各州、各地方政府都编制执行自己的独立预算。 2.资本预算准确性不高，风险大

Back in 1996, Jefferson County entered into a consent decree with the federal Environmental Protection Agency to make extensive improvements to its sewer system. The county financed the improvements through several bond offerings. The project was originally estimated to cost around $1.5 billion, but its scope eventually climbed to $3 billion. (Sewer rates quadrupled over four years in order to pay for the project.)

3，预算执行过程腐败盛行

In 2002, the FBI launched an investigation into the county’s construction program, which resulted in the conviction of 21 people, including contractors, county commissioners, and county employees. The convictions were mainly related to construction firms bribing local officials to obtain business.

4.预算知识匮乏，欺诈

(As I said before, since the JP Morgan bankers were confident no one would check their swap math, there really was not much of a ceiling on the cost they would pass on to taxpayers.) Just to be clear, the net effect of this transaction was that Jefferson County taxpayers ended up paying Goldman and Rice not to do business with the county. 5.预算中的政治性因素 案情描述

2011年11月9日,美国阿拉巴马州杰斐逊县县政府向当地法院申请破产。据报道,该县背负的债务达41亿美元,这是美国历史上规模最大的政府破产案。

杰斐逊县的债务主要来自于重修过于老旧的下水管道的费用。因饮用水卫生状况受到起诉，该县于1995年开始大规模下水道改造工程，总共花费32亿美元。后来政府试图通过发行一种组合债券来节约资金，这一努力在2008年宣告失败，县政府财政状况急剧恶化。

几年前,杰斐逊县大搞公共基础设施建设,借钱翻新本县的污水处理系统。由于经济持续不景气,杰斐逊县的债务开始不断累积,利息年年攀升。到2008年,由于无法归还借款,杰斐逊县债务危机开始浮现。

Beginning in the spring of 2008, the county began hiring and firing various firms (like Merrill and Citi), who were to advise the commission on its debt restructuring options. (Those firms were soon to have larger problems of their own…) It was at this time that the county began tossing around the idea of filing for Chapter 9 bankruptcy. The state’s pension system had considered purchasing the county’s debt – genius, I know – but only on the condition that the county prepared a bankruptcy filing to force creditors into serious negotiations.

2008年8月，JP Morgan made the bombshell announcement that the firm would exit the municipal swap business altogether and fire a bunch of employees at regional offices. ，the county’s financial adviser had estimated that JP Morgan had overcharged Jefferson County by as much as $100 million for the various sewer refinancings.

Things became much worse for Jefferson County in 2009. A local court struck down the county’s occupational and business license taxes (ruling that the state legislature had enacted the taxes illegally during the legislative session), a decision that was eventually appealed to and upheld by the Alabama Supreme Court. Those taxes comprised one-third of the county’s general fund budget. The county went into full austerity mode after the ruling, shutting down offices, furloughing employees, and so on.

2011年9月,杰斐逊县县政务委员会在债务问题的谈判上陷入僵局。来自杰斐逊县代表团的25位民主党议员拒绝与持有31.4亿美元地方债券的债权人达成协议。

最近,杰斐逊县县政务委员在举行两天闭门会议后进行表决,以四比一的结果,投票同意依据《美国破产法典》第九章向法院申请破产保护。县政府依据第九章申请破产保护,避免因债权人逼迫,抛售资产。

破产原因 1.腐败

杰斐逊县的债务水平，自2000年为升级污水管道系统而发债开始步步推升。在那时，贪污腐败、收受贿赂以及收费欺诈的现象盛行，包括被推选出的行政官员和公务员在内的22个人因此认罪。2010年因涉及推动数十亿污水管道债务的商业腐败交易 2.错误的资本预算，错误的长期投资计划。 3.利率风险

杰斐逊县使用了华尔街的最新产品，拍卖利率债券(Auction Rate Bonds)和利率互换(Interest Rate Swaps)。本来，县政府发行债券，根据其财政收入情况，以适当利率发行即可。可是，政府却发行拍卖利率债券，即债券定期（一个月或者一星期）拍卖，以最低可能利率付钱。当2008年债券没人购买时，利率上涨了好几倍，县政府就负担不起。

利率互换，即县政府付固定利率，收浮动利率；华尔街的银行则付浮动利率，收固定利率。正常情况下，利率互换跟拍卖利率形成对冲，即县政府在拍卖利率中实际付的是浮动利率，而在利率互换中，收浮动利率，付固定利率，两者一结合，形成对冲，即杰斐逊县实际付的是固定利率。可惜的是，现在浮动利率很低，加上华尔街的各种费用，使得杰斐逊县在利率互换中又赔了钱，最后终于无力承担，申请破产了事。

2008年拍卖利率债券的投资者开始担心债券的流动性，评级机构下调杰斐逊县政府债券的担保方的评级，导致

S&P cut the sewer bonds’ ratings to junk in February and was followed by Moody’s in March. 4.该县破产的主要原因就是，最初协议融资缩水1.4亿美元。而除去污水管道债券不算，杰斐逊县本财年总体基金预算削减至2.17亿美元，还有0.4亿美元的资金缺口，因此这比融资至关重要。