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performatives.

46. Explicit Performatives:

This type of performatives expresses the speech act explicitly and directly through affirmative statements. For example,

I warn you that there is a sheep-dog in the closet.

According to Austin, explicit performatives must use performative verbs to indicate that the speaker is doing a thing with words. Some performative verbs he listed are 'bet, promise, warn, challenge, declare, dare, name, swear, nominate, advise, apologise,\Implicit Performatives:

This type of performatives uses no prerformative verbs to perform act. Consider the following examples as: 12)

a. You may go now. (I order you to go now.) b. Guilty! (I pronounce you guilty!) c. Go away! (I order you to go away.)

d. I will be back at six. (I promise to come back at six.)

Because there is a lack of performative verbs in implicit performatives, consequently different understanding towards an implicit performative sentence can be possible. 47. Austin divides performatives into five categories:

1) verdictives: typified by the giving of a verdict, estimate, grade, or appraisal (e.g. 'We find the accused guilty.').

2) Exercitives: the exercising of powers, rights, or influences as in appointing, ordering, warning, or advising (e.g. 'I pronounced you man and wife.').

3) Comissives: typified by promising or undertaking, and committing one to do something by, for example, announcing an intention or espousing a cause (e.g. 'I hereby bequeath.' ).

4) Behabitives: having to do with such matters as apologizing, congratulating, blessing, cursing, or challenging (e.g. 'I apologize.').

5) Expositives: a term used to refer to how one makes utterances fit into an argument or exposition ( e.g. 'I argue', 'I reply' , or 'I assume.')

48. According to Searle, we can perform at least three different kinds of act when we speak. There are utterance acts, propositional acts, and illocutionary acts. If we look at how we perform certain kinds of acts rather than at how particular types of utterances perform acts, we can, as Searle has indicated, categorize at least six ways in which we can make requests or give orders even indirectly. There are utterance types that focus on the hearer's ability to do something ('Can you pass the salt?' ; 'Have you got change for a dollar?'); those that focus on the speaker's wish or desire that the hearer will do something (' I would like you to go now'; ' I wish you wouldn't do that'); those that focus on the hearer's actually doing something ('Officers will hence force wear ties at dinner', 'Aren't you going to eat your cereal?'); those that focus on the hearer's willingness or desire to do something ('Would you be willing to write a letter of recommendation for me?'; 'Would you mind not making so much noise?'); those that focus on the reasons for doing something ( 'You are standing on my foot'; 'It might help if you shut up'); and finally, those that embed one of the above types inside another (' I would appreciate it if you could make less noise'; 'Might I ask you to take off your hat?')

Searle has concentrated his work on speech acts on how a hearer perceives a particular utterance

to have the force it has, what he calls the 'uptake' of an utterance, which is roughly equivalent to its perlocutionary force.