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Subject well-being Subjective well-being

1 Subjective well-being and well-being simpliciter

In this section, I explore the relationship between subjective well-being and well-being simpliciter in the writings on subjective measures. I will argue that proponents of subjective measures of well-being disagree about the relationship between subjective well-being and well-being simpliciter: about whether subjective well-being constitutes well-being simpliciter or merely is a component of it.

As my starting point, I take the concept of well-being, that is, what I have so far called well-being simpliciter: ―what we have when our lives are going well for us, when we are living lives that are not necessarily morally good, but good for us‖ (Tiberius, 2006, p. 493,italics in original). Let us call this the ―core‖ concept of well-being. There are many other terms that are used in the same sense, including ―a person‘s good, benefit, advantage, interest, prudential value, welfare, happiness, flourishing, eudaimonia, and utility‖ (Moore &Crisp, 1996, p. 599). Because the concept of well-being is intended to capture what is ultimately – and not just instrumentally – good for the individual, it is also supposed to capture that which we have reason to promote – as an end and not just as a means – both in our own lives and in the lives of others. As Thomas Scanlon puts it: It is commonly supposed that there is a simple notion of individual well-being that plays the following three roles. First, it serves as an important basis for the decisions of a single rational individual, at least for those decisions in which he or she alone is concerned (that is to say, in which moral obligations and concerns for others can be left aside). Second, it is what a concerned benefactor, such as a friend or parent, has reason to promote. Third, it is the basis on which an individual‘s interests are taken into account in moral argument (Scanlon, 1998,p. 93).3

In particular, it is frequently assumed that well-being is one consideration or as some people would argue, the only consideration that should serve as an end, and not just a

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Subject well-being means for public policy. Here I will take it for granted that when proponents of subjective measures talk about such measures as representing well-being, they use the term in the core sense (Angner, 2009a, in press). First, as indicated above, subjective measures are often presented as alternatives to other measures of welfare or well-being; this would make little sense if, in fact, subjective measures were not intended to represent that which the other measures were designed to represent viz. welfare or well-being. Second, the proponents‘ concept of well-being plays the very same role as that played by the core concept: those who defend the use of subjective measures of wellbeing often emphasize that they think of well-being as that which is ultimately good for the individual, as that which is worth promoting in the life of others, and as a central (sometimes the only) ultimate goal for public policy (cf. Diener & Seligman, 2004, quoted above).Third, a number of proponents explicitly cite classical philosophical literature in enthusiastic agreement while signaling that they use ―well-being‖ and/or ―happiness‖ in the same sense as philosophers do (Kahneman, Wakker,&Sarin, 1997; Layard, 2005; Watson, 1930). Over the years, philosophers have tried to shed light on the concept of well-being by developing and defending various accounts, or conceptions of well-being. Here, I follow Parfit (1984, pp.493–502) in dividing such accounts into three main classes: mental state accounts, preference-satisfaction or desire-fulfillment accounts, and objective-list accounts.4 According to mental-state accounts, well-being is a ―mental state‖ or a ―state of mind.‖ Because these accounts all see welfare ―as having to enter our experience,‖ they are said to satisfy the experience requirement (Griffin, 1986, p. 13). Scanlon writes: ―Experiential theories hold that the quality of life ?for the person who lives it‘ is completely determined by its experiential quality,‖ where ―experiential quality‖ refers to ―what it would be like to live it‖ (Scanlon, 1998, pp. 97, 99). On this view, then, subjectively felt experience is both necessary and sufficient for a person‘s well-being. According to desire-fulfillment or preference-satisfaction accounts, by contrast, a person is well off to the extent that her desires are fulfilled and/or her preferences are satisfied. Scanlon puts it this way:Desire theories reject the experience requirement and allow that a person‘s life can be made better and worse not only by changes in that person‘s states of consciousness but also by changes elsewhere in the world which fulfill that person‘s preferences (Scanlon, 1993, p. 186).

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Subject well-being Such accounts do not require that a person who is well off experience any feelings of happiness or satisfaction. What they do require is that her desires are fulfilled (or that her preferences are satisfied), which does not come down to the same thing. The two kinds of account described so far are frequently referred to as subjective accounts, because they describe a person‘s well-being as (at least partly) a function of his or her feelings, experiences, desires, and so on. According to so-called objective accounts, by contrast, a person‘s well-being does not depend on such subjective factors. On such accounts, ―certain things are good or bad for beings, independently in at least some cases of whether they are desired or whether they give rise to pleasurable experiences‖ (Chappell & Crisp, 1998,p. 553). Identifying the list of things that are good for people regardless of what they want is notoriously difficult, but one provisional list of such things includes ―moral goodness, rational activity, the development of one‘s abilities, having children and being a good parent, knowledge, and the awareness of true beauty‖ (Parfit, 1984,p. 499). Obviously, there are many versions of accounts of each kind.

The tri-partite division permits us to capture a major difference between subjective measures of well-being, traditional economic welfare measures, and welfare indicators inspired by the capability approach. It has been noted elsewhere that traditional economic welfare measures are based on preference-satisfaction accounts of well-being (Angner, 2009a,b, in press; Harsanyi, 1982; Hausman & McPherson, 2006). This is evident, among other things, from the fact that welfare economists traditionally have defended their measures by showing that they are utility functions, that is, that they are indices of preference satisfaction. It has also been noted that measures inspired by the capability approach are based on objective-list accounts of well-being (Nussbaum, 2008; Sen, 1987). This is clear, among other things, from the assumption that certain things – in particular, having a large capability set – are thought to be good for a person regardless of whether those things would make the person happier, and of whether the person desires them.5 Meanwhile, it is fairly obvious that many proponents of subjective measures think of well-being as a mental state. There is abundant evidence, for one thing, that they adhere to the experience requirement. In the literature on subjective measures,well-being is often described as a matter exclusively of individual subjective, hedonic, or affective experience. For example, David G. Myers quotes Madame de la Fayette as saying: ―If one thinks that

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